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KAIST ±ÝÀ¶Àü¹®´ëÇпø
  1. ±³¼öº° ¿¬±¸½Ç
 
  1. Prof. Byungjin Kwak (°ûº´Áø ±³¼ö ¿¬±¸½Ç)
 
  1. Paper Number KCB-PP-2006-110
    Title ÀÚÁø°ø½Ã°¡ Á¤º¸ºñ´ëĪ¿¡ ¹ÌÄ¡´Â ¿µÇâ
    Author ¼Õ¼º±Ô;°ûº´Áø;±è¿¬È­
    publisher Çѱ¹È¸°èÇÐȸ
    citation Çѱ¹È¸°èÇÐȸ Çмú¿¬±¸¹ßǥȸ ³í¹®Áý Çѱ¹È¸°èÇÐȸ 2006³âµµ Çϰè ȸ°èÇаü·Ã ÅëÇÕ ±¹Á¦Çмú´ëȸ ¹ßÇ¥³í¹®Áý(ÇÏ), 2006. 6, pp.805~832(28)
    Keywords ¼ö½Ã°ø½Ã; ÀÚÁø°ø½Ã; Á¤º¸ºñ´ëĪ; timely disclosure; voluntary disclosure; information asymmetry
    Abstract ÀÚÁø°ø½Ã´Â ¼ö½Ã°ø½ÃÀÇ ÇÑ ÇüÅ·ΠÁ¤º¸ Àü´ÞÀÇ ¸ñÀûÀ¸·Î ÁøÇàµÇ¾ú´Ù. Á¤º¸ºñ´ëĪÀ» ÇØ¼ÒÇÑ´Ù´Â Â÷¿ø¿¡¼­´Â ÀÚÁø°ø½Ã´Â ¼ø±â´ÉÀûÀÎ ¿ªÇÒÀ» ¼öÇàÇÏÁö¸¸ ¹Ý¸é¿¡ ¿Ö°îµÈ Á¤º¸°¡ Àü´ÞµÉ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù´Â Â÷¿ø¿¡¼­´Â ¿ª±â´ÉÀûÀÎ ¸éÀÌ ¾øÁö ¾Ê´Ù. À̴ ƯÈ÷ ÀÚÁø°ø½Ã°¡ °­Á¦°ø½Ã°¡ ¾Æ´Ï¹Ç·Î À̸¦ ±ÔÁ¦ÇϱⰡ »ó´ëÀûÀ¸·Î ¾î·Æ±â ¶§¹®À̱⵵ ÇÏ´Ù. º» ¿¬±¸´Â ÀÚÁø°ø½Ã¸¦ ¸¹ÀÌ ¼öÇàÇÑ ±â¾÷ÀÇ À繫ºÐ¼®°¡ ¿¹ÃøºÐ»êÀÌ ÀÛÀºÁö, ¿¹Ãø¿ÀÂ÷°¡ ÀÛÀºÁö¸¦ °ËÁõÇϰí ÀÚÁø°ø½Ã¸¦ ¸¹ÀÌ ÇÏ´Â ±â¾÷ÀÇ À繫ºÐ¼®°¡ ¼ö°¡ ¸¹ÀºÁö¸¦ °ËÁõÇÑ´Ù. ½ÇÁõºÐ¼® °á°ú´Â ÀÚÁø°ø½Ã¸¦ ¸¹ÀÌ ÇÏ´Â ±â¾÷ÀÇ À繫ºÐ¼®°¡ ÀÌÀÍ¿¹ÃøºÐ»êÀº À¯ÀÇÀûÀ¸·Î ÀÛÀº °ÍÀ¸·Î ³ªÅ¸³µ°í ÀÚÁø°ø½Ã¿Í À繫ºÐ¼®°¡ ¿¹Ãø¿ÀÂ÷´Â À¯ÀÇÀûÀÎ °ü°è¸¦ º¸ÀÌÁö ¾Ê¾Ò´Ù. ÀÚÁø°ø½Ã¸¦ ¸¹ÀÌ ¼öÇàÇÏ´Â ±â¾÷¿¡ ´ëÇØ ¿¹ÃøÀ» ¼öÇàÇÏ´Â À繫ºÐ¼®°¡ ¼ö°¡ ¸¹¾Æ Á¤º¸È¯°æÀÌ ÁÁ´Ù°í ÇØ¼®ÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù. ÀÚÁø°ø½Ã´Â Áö¼ÓÀûÀ¸·Î È®´ëµÇ´Â Ãß¼¼ÀÌ´Ù. ¹Ý¸é¿¡ ÀÚ¹ßÀûÀÎ °ø½Ã¿¡ ´ëÇØ¼­´Â °æÁ¦½Å¹®¿¡ ³ªÅ¸³­ °ø½Ã ¹× IR¿¡ ³ªÅ¸³­ °ø½Ã¿¡ ´ëÇØ¼­¸¸ ¿¬±¸°¡ ¼öÇàµÇ¾úÀ¸³ª ¼ö½Ã°ø½Ã·Î¼­ÀÇ ÀÚÁø°ø½Ã¿¡ ´ëÇØ¼­´Â ¿¬±¸°¡ ¼öÇàµÇÁö ¾Ê¾Ò´Ù. ¾ÕÀ¸·Î ÀÚÁø°ø½ÃÀÇ ÀǹÌ, ½Ã»çÁ¡ ¹× °³¼±Ã¥ µî°ú °ü·ÃµÈ Ãß°¡ÀûÀÎ ¿¬±¸°¡ ¼öÇàµÇ¾î¾ß ÇÑ´Ù. This study examines whether firms voluntary disclosures contribute to mitigate the information asymmetry between managers and investors (and/or among investors). In general, voluntary disclosures are expected to decrease the information asymmetry, but investors and regulators concern the credibility of voluntary disclosures. Thus, in order to protect investors by enhancing the credibility of voluntary disclosures, the Koreangovernment enacted a rule to incorporate voluntary disclosures into a part of its regulation system in March, 2000, as a device of timely disclosures ruled by Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) and Korea Exchange (KRX), and the government has been encouraging firms to voluntarily disclose their private information through its regulation system. While disclosures on firms Investor Relation (IR) is not intervened by any government system, the false voluntary disclosures on the FSS system can be punished by the government. Unlike mandatory reporting and the disclosures on firms IR, however, the effect of the voluntary disclosures through the system on the information asymmetry has not been investigated. In order to examine the effect, we use all types of the voluntary disclosures on the system, not just management earnings forecasts. We use the dispersion of analysts earnings forecasts, the accuracy of analysts earnings forecasts, and the number of analysts following a firm, as proxies for the information asymmetry. The results show that the frequency of the voluntary disclosures on the system is significantly and negatively related to the dispersion of analysts earnings forecasts, and it is significantly and positively related to the number of analysts following a firm. However, it is insignificantly related to the accuracy of analysts earnings forecasts. Overall, the voluntary disclosures on the FSS system help firms to decrease the information asymmetry.
    Full-Text PDF 
 
  1. ¡Ø Journal
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    KCB-PP-2012-008 The composition of top management with general counsel and voluntary information disclosure Kwak, Byungjin
    Ro, ByungT.
    Suk, Inho
    »çÀÌÆ®¸µÅ©HTML PDF 
    KCB-PP-2009-011 °â¾÷È­¿Í ÀºÇàÀÇ °æ¿µ¼º°ú: 66°³±¹ »ó¾÷ÀºÇàÀڷḦ ÀÌ¿ëÇÑ ½ÇÁõ¿¬±¸ ÀÌÀçÈ­, °ûº´Áø
    ¹Ú±¤¿ì, ¹Ú·¡¼ö
    »çÀÌÆ®¸µÅ©HTML PDF 
    KCB-PP-2008-049 JD/MBA º¹¼öÇÐÀ§°úÁ¤ÀÇ ÇØ¿Ü ¿î¿µ ÇöȲ ¹× ±¹³» µµÀÔ °¡´É¼º¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¿¬±¸ °ûº´Áø, ¹éÀ±¼®
    À̰æ±Ô, °íÇмö
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    KCB-PP-2008-036 ÀÚÀ²°ø½Ã°¡ À繫ºÐ¼®°¡ ÀÌÀÍ¿¹Ãø¿¡ ¹ÌÄ¡´Â ¿µÇâ ((The Effect of Voluntary Disclosures on Analysts Earning Forecasts)) ¼Õ¼º±Ô, °ûº´Áø
    ±è¿¬È­,
    »çÀÌÆ®¸µÅ©HTML PDF 
    KCB-PP-2006-110 ÀÚÁø°ø½Ã°¡ Á¤º¸ºñ´ëĪ¿¡ ¹ÌÄ¡´Â ¿µÇâ ¼Õ¼º±Ô, °ûº´Áø
    ±è¿¬È­,
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    µî·ÏµÈ ÀÚ·á°¡ ¾ø½À´Ï´Ù
 
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    µî·ÏµÈ ÀÚ·á°¡ ¾ø½À´Ï´Ù
 
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