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> Academic Programs > M.S/Ph.D. > Introduction
- Industrial Economic Analysis - IDEAL (»ê¾÷°æÁ¦ºÐ¼®)
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Paper Number KCB-PP-2009-045 Title ÀüÀÚ»ó°Å·¡ÇÏ¿¡¼ ä³Î°¥µî°ú ´åÄıâ¾÷ÀÇ ºÐÇÒ¿¡ °üÇÑ ¿¬±¸ Author õ;¼¼ÇÐ; ¹Ú;¼º¿ë; ±è;Àçö publisher Çѱ¹»óǰÇÐȸ citation »óǰÇבּ¸, 27±Ç 2È£, 2009, pp. 23-31 Abstract º» ³í¹®¿¡¼´Â ¿Â¶óÀΰú ¿ÀÇÁ¶óÀο¡¼ µ¿ÀÏ ºê·£µå Á¦Ç°À» ÆÇ¸ÅÇÏ´Â °æ¿ì, Á¦Á¶È¸»ç¿Í À¯Åëȸ»ç°£ÀÇ Ã¤³Î°¥µîÀ» °í·ÁÇÑ °¡°Ý Àü·«À» µµÃâÇØ º»´Ù. ƯÈ÷ Á¦Á¶È¸»çµéÀÌ ÀÎÅͳÝÀ¸·Î Á¦Ç°À» Á÷Á¢ ÆÇ¸ÅÇÏ´Â °æ¿ì À¯Åëȸ»ç¿Í Á¦Á¶È¸»çÀÇ Ã¤³ÎÆÄ¿ö¿¡ µû¶ó ±â¾÷ÀÇ °¡°ÝÀü·«ÀÌ ¾î¶»°Ô ´Þ¶óÁö´ÂÁö »ìÆìº»´Ù. Á¦Á¶È¸»ç°¡ ¿Â¶óÀΰ¡°Ý°ú ¿ÀÇÁ¶óÀÎ °¡°ÝÀ» ¸ÅÄ¡½ÃŰ´Â °æ¿ì, Á¦Á¶È¸»ç°¡ ¸®´õÀÎ °æ¿ì, À¯Åëȸ»ç°¡ ¸®´õÀÎ °æ¿ì, Vertical NashÀÎ °æ¿ì¿¡ °¢°¢ÀÇ °ü·Ã °¡°ÝµéÀ» µµÃâÇϰí, ¾î¶² °æ¿ì¿¡ ¿Â¶óÀΰú ¿ÀÇÁ¶óÀÎ °¡°Ý¿¡ ÀÖ¾î¼ Â÷À̰¡ ³ª´Â °¡¸¦ °íÂûÇÏ¿© º»´Ù. °ø±Þ»ç½½ üÀλ󿡼 °¡°Ý ¼³Á¤ ½Ã¿¡ ¹ß»ýÇÒ ¼ö Àִ ä³Î°¥µîÀ» °í·ÁÇϸé¼, ¿Â¶óÀΰú ¿ÀÇÁ¶óÀÎ ºñ¿ëÀÇ Â÷ÀÌ, ¼ÒºñÀÚ ÀÌÁú¼º µîÀÌ °¡°Ý°áÁ¤¿¡ ¾î¶² ¿µÇâÀ» ¹ÌÄ¡´Â Áö¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¸ðµ¨À» Á¦½ÃÇÏ¿© ±âÁ¸ ¿¬±¸¸¦ È®ÀåÇÏ¿´´Ù. Abstract (Other) In this paper, we investigate the pricing strategy when there exist channel conflicts between manufacturer and retalier in hybrid marketing setting. In particular, we examine how the pricing strategies are affected when channel powers create different types of channel conflicts. In order to examine these relationships, four different situations: matching strategy, retailer-Stakelberg, manufacturer-Stakelberg, Vertical Nash, are compared in terms of prices. The differences in the online and off-line costs that consumers face and the consumer heterogeneity are considered. ISSN 1226-6132
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Contact : ±èÇà¶õ (hrkim@business.kaist.ac.kr)





































