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Gradual bargaining in decentralized asset markets

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS2021-10

Rocheteau, Guillaume | Hu, Tai-Wei | Lebeau, Lucie | In, Younghwan

We introduce a new approach to bargaining, with strategic and axiomatic foundations, into models of decentralized asset markets. According to this approach, which encompasses the Nash (1950) solution as a special case, bilateral negotiations follow an agenda that partitions assets into bundles to be sold sequentially. We construct two alternating-offer games consistent with this approach and characterize their subgame perfect equilibria. We show the revenue of the asset owner is maximized when assets are sold one infinitesimal unit at a time. In a general equilibrium model with endogenous asset holdings, gradual bargaining reduces asset misallocation and prevents market breakdowns. ⓒ 2020 Elsevier Inc.

Publisher
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
Issue Date
2021-10
Article Type
Article
Citation
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS, Vol.42, pp.72 - 109
ISSN
1094-2025
DOI
10.1016/j.red.2020.10.008
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