경영경제 분야 세미나를 아래와 같이 개최하오니, 관심 있는 분들의 많은 참석 부탁 드립니다.

1. 일시: 2018년 10월 11일 (목), 16:00~17:30
2. 장소: 9호관 7층 9705 강의실
3. 강사: 유석종 교수 (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics)
4. 주제: Reputation with Multiple Commitment Types: continuous-time.
5. 연구분야: 경영경제
* Lecture will be delivered in English
* Seminar materials: Attachment

Abstract:
We study reputation with imperfect monitoring in which a large player faces a continuum of infinitely-lived small players. As did in the literature on reputation effects, we allow a framework in which the support of the prior belief of small players contains any finite number of commitment types. In this setting, we characterize a partial differential equation (PDE) for the equilibrium payoff, we derive an optimality condition for the equilibrium actions, and we show the existence of an approximate Markov equilibrium. Also, we provide a stochastic representation of the approximate Markov equilibrium payoffs, which is the solution to an approximate PDE. Finally, we show that the equilibrium actions of the sufficiently patient large player follows a non-stationary process that depends on the small players' posterior beliefs about commitment types.