Academic SeminarBest-Response Perfect Equilibrium
- 일시
- 2018-10-22 ~ 2018-10-22
경영경제 분야 세미나를 아래와 같이 개최하오니, 관심 있는 분들의 많은 참석 부탁 드립니다.
1. 일시: 2018년 10월 22일 (목), 16:00~17:30
2. 장소: 9호관 7층 9705 강의실
3. 강사: 김정유 교수 (경희대학교)
4. 주제: Best-Response Perfect Equilibrium
5. 연구분야: 경영경제
* Lecture will be delivered in Korean.
Abstract
In noncooperative game theory, it has been a challenging issue to define a point-
valued solution concept which is robust to any perturbation in strategies and whose
existence is guaranteed. In this paper, we propose several point-valued equilibrium
concepts which are almost robust to any arbitrary perturbations in strategies. All of
them are based on the approach to approximating the best response correspondence by a sequence of continuous quasi-best-response functions.
In particular, the weakly best-response perfect equilibrium (WBRPE), which is our main equilibrium concept, requires the intersection of quasi-best-response functions to have a subsequence to converge to the equilibrium for any sequence of continuous functions which converges uniformly to the best response correspondence on a restricted domain. We prove that WBRPE always exists in any two-person non-trivial game, i.e., game without unilaterally equivalent strategies, by using Brouwer’s fixed point theorem.