경영경제 분야 세미나를 아래와 같이 개최하오니, 관심 있는 분들의 많은 참석 부탁 드립니다.

1. 일시: 2019년 04월 02일 (화), 16:00~17:20
2. 장소: 9호관 3층, 9303호 강의실
3. 강사: 임우영 교수 (홍콩과학기술대학교)
4. 주제: Bargaining and Time Preferences: An Experimental Study
5. 연구분야: 경영경제
* Language: 한국어

[Abstract]
Several experimental studies in the literature investigated how time preferences govern bargaining outcomes in the canonical, infinite-horizon alternating-offers bargaining model of (Rubinstein, 1982, Econometrica) but the evidence is mixed. We revisit the problem with a novel experimental design in which bargaining game payoffs are paid over a long period of time with different payment windows (weekly or monthly) exogenously assigned to each subject. Using this effective discounting procedure, we test theoretical predictions presented 1) in the absence of dynamically inconsistent time-preferences (Rubinstein, 1982, Econometrica) and 2) in the presence of such time-inconsistent preferences (Schweighofer-Kodritsch, 2018, Econometrica). We find unambiguous experimental support for several major theoretical predictions. In all treatments, a vast majority of agreements was reached with no or minor delays, and with a significant and substantial first-mover advantage. In the treatments without any delayed (1 week) payment schedule, the bargainer with a larger effective discount factor received a larger share. In the treatment in which the immediate agreement was made impossible by the payment delay introduced to both bargainers, however, the difference in the agreed shares between the bargainers with different effective discount factors became less significant statistically and less substantial in magnitude. These results suggest that bargainers' discount function is quite flat after failing to achieve an immediate agreement.